The numbers, before anyone's argument about them.

Across this week Kosovo drew an average of 353 MW from North Macedonia and sent 291 MW on to Montenegro, for a net position of just +87 MW. It is not short by that much — it is a corridor. Montenegro then moves roughly 419 MW out to Italy, which is where a large part of the region's surplus physically leaves for the EU.

Select a country to see every border it holds, which way the power actually went, and how far each link swung across the week.

Albania lost 51% of the electricity it generated in 1990. By 2023 it lost 12%. That is among the largest sustained loss reductions recorded anywhere, and it happened in this region — which answers the usual objection that these numbers are structural and cannot be moved.

Thirty-four years, six countries, each series running to its own last published year.

Kosovo generates electricity at 903 grams of CO₂ per kilowatt-hour. Albania, across the border, generates at 24 — almost entirely hydro. Two neighbouring grids, already interconnected, nearly forty times apart on the single number that decarbonisation policy is written against.

That gap is the regional opportunity and the regional risk at once, and it is why a target set in one capital cannot be assessed without the other. Follow either line back to 2000 to see how quickly — or how little — that position has actually changed.

Every transition debate in this region is about what to build. Rather less of it is about what is already being lost — in networks, in buildings, and in the energy an economy burns per unit of output. Those losses are recoverable capacity, usually at a fraction of the cost of new generation, and they do not need a connection agreement.

Three indicators, each with its own publication year, none of them ranked against the others. The reason is directly below the figures.